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Thispaper examines the effect ofcapital controls on the
response ofinvestment to savings in Pacific Basin coun-
tries. A robust finding is that the size of the savings
coefficient tends to be smaller (larger) in countries with
relatively higher (lower) capital controls. Additionally,
relaxation in capital controls for the most part had no
discernible impact on the savings-investment relationship
in individual country time-series regressions. At least a
partial resolution to these puzzles is found in the govern-
ment policy response: Countries with a relatively high
saving-investmentcorrelation tendedto have governments
that counteredwidening current account imbalances with
fiscal policy; the reverse generally held truefor countries
with low saving-investment correlation. In fact, for this
latter group ofcountries, financing the government deficit
throughforeign borrowing wasamajorfactor inloosening
the link between national saving and investment.
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The last two decades have witnessed a successive wave of
deregulationofinternationalcapital markets. How has this
greater freedom of movement of capital among countries
affected national saving and investment, two key macro-
economic variables? Theoretically the answer is relatively
straightforward: With greater capital mobility, the level of
investment a country can undertake need not be con-
strained by the level ofdomestic saving, since any shortfall
can be financed by foreign saving. In other words, the
dismantling of capital controls would loosen the link
between national saving and investment.
The empirical evidence, on the other hand, has been
more controversial. Most notably, Feldstein and Horioka
(1980) found that among industrial countries, the invest-
ment rate is highly correlated with the saving rate, thus
suggesting that capital is less mobile internationally than
commonly presumed. The study subsequently spawned
two additional puzzles: First, the saving-investment cor-
relation does not appear to decline over time despite the
continued relaxation of capital controls (Feldstein 1983,
Penati and Dooley 1984); second, the saving-investment
correlation appears to be weaker for developing countries
thanfor industrialcountries, despitethe generally accepted
view that the latter group of countries tend to have more
developed financial markets with comparatively fewer re-
strictions on international transactions (Dooley, et aI.,
1987, Wong 1990). In sum, available evidence to date
suggests that the degree of capital control has relatively
little bearing on the observed response of investment to
national saving.
This paper examines the effectofcapital controls on the
response ofinvestmentto saving in PacificBasincountries.
The exercise is of interest for at least two reasons. First,
a frequently emphasized factor in the economic dynamism
of the Pacific Basin is the growing integration of the
region, in terms of flows of both goods and capital.
Whether one can find a systematic link between progres-
sive dismantling ofcapital controls and loosened saving-
investment linkages in the region is an empirical question
that has not been addressed to date. Second, the Pacific
23Basin encompasses a broad array of countries in varying
stages of economic and financial development, degree of
capital controls, and speed ofdismantling these controls.
The region therefore provides us with substantial cross-
country variation to assess the impactofcapitalcontrols on
saving-investment linkages.
This study uses the Feldstein-Horioka (FH hereafter)
methodology with due adjustments made to address some
ofthe econometriccriticisms levied againstit. Unlike most
empiricalworkinthe area, the paperfocuses on time series
correlation between savings and investment. This ap-
proach allo\vs cross-countI"'j comparisons in the response
ofinvestment to national savings, as well as analysis ofthe
relationship over time in a given country. The advantage of
this approach is that it makes it possible to exploit our
knowledge of the divergent history of capital controls of
the countries in the region.
The analysis reveals that capital controls have had little
impact on saving-investment relationships in the Pacific
Basin. In fact, the estimated size ofthe savings coefficient
tends to be smaller (larger) in countries with relatively
higher (lower) capital controls, and this result is robust
across several specifications. Additionally, relaxation in
capitalcontrols for the mostparthad no discernible impact
onthe saving-investmentrelationship inindividualcountry
regressions. At leasta partial resolution to these puzzles is
found in government policy response. Most notably, coun-
tries with a relatively high saving-investment correlation,
despite low capital controls, tended to have governments
that countered widening current account imbalances with
fiscal policy. The reverse generally held true for countries
with low saving-investment correlation, despite relatively
high capital controls. In fact, for this latter group of
countries, financing thegovernmentdeficitthroughforeign
borrowingwas a majorfactor inloosening the linkbetween
national saving and investment.
Thebalanceofthepaperis organizedas follows. Section
I surveys changes in capital controls in the Pacific Basin
countries over the past three decades. SectionII briefly
discusses the FH test ofcapital mobility and reviews some
ofthe major.criticisms leveled against it. Section III then
undertakes various tests of saving-investment correlation
in the Pacific Basin countries and interprets the results in
lightofwhat we know about the history ofcapital controls
in the region. Section IV concludes.
I. DEREGULATION OF CAPITAL CONTROLS
IN THE PACIFIC BASIN
In order to provide a more concrete context for the empiri-
calanalysis thatfollows, this sectionhighlights some ofthe
important policy changes affecting capital flows that have
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occurred in the thirteen Pacific Basin countries up until
1991 (Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan,
Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singa-
pore, Taiwan, Thailand, andtheU.S.). The purpose here is
notto provide anexhaustive andcomprehensive accountof
financial deregulation in the region. Rather, the basic aim
is to sketch out the salient features ofthe regulatory envi-
ronment of the countries under review, then draw some
cross-country comparisons on the degree ofcapital mobil-
ity and how such mobility may have changed over time in
individual countries as a result ofpolicy reforms.
Until at least the late 1970s, most Pacific Basin countries
maintainedtightregulationand administrativecontrolover
their financial systems, including interest rate restric-
tions, segmentedfinancial markets and institutions, under-
developed moneyandcapital markets, andcreditallocation
and control mechanisms.1These policies reflected the then
widely held view that economic growth and other national
goals wouldbebetterservedby restrainingmarketforces in
the pricing as well as the allocation ofcredit.
Inorderto preventdomestic entitiesfrom circumventing
these regulations through overseas transactions, most Pa-
cific Basin countries also applied, to varying degrees,
controls over international capital movements. Capital
controls curbed capital flight, insulated domestic inter-
est rates from the rest of the world, and maintained
the compartmentalization of domestic financial markets.
Additionally, these co,ntrols buttressed the fixed exchange
rate system and helped to achieve balance-of-payments
objectives.
As is evidentfrom the summaryofcapitalcontrols in the
Appendix, Pacific Basin countries diverge considerably as
to when liberalization of capital controls was intiated,
as well as with respect to its speed once the process was
under way.2,3 At one end of the spectrum are four coun-
1. For overviews of financial markets and liberalization in the Pacific
Basin up to the mid-1980s, see Cargill, Cheng and Hutchison (1986),
Mathieson (1986), Patrick and Cole (1986), and Greenwood (1986).
2. Countries also have diverged in the sequencing ofderegulation; that
is, whether relaxation of international capital accounts followed or
precededliberalizationofthedomestic financial sector. Accordingto the
so-called sequencing theory (McKinnon 1991, Edwards 1990), interna-
tionalliberalization, particularly ofthe capital account, should come at
the last stage of economic liberalization. Within the Pacific Basin,
Singapore, Korea, and Taiwan have broadly conformed to this theory by
liberalizing the domestic financial sector while maintaining a consider-
able degreeofcapitalcontrol. Indonesia, Malaysia, Japan, and Thailand
appear to have adopted a reversed order offinancial liberalization. See
Santiprabhob (1992).
3. Emphasis differs on what has been the prime impetus to relaxing
exchange and capital controls. Cargill, Cheng, Hutchison (1986) con-
tend that strict exchange and capital controls were not compatible with
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and Singapore, which traditionally have imposed few re-
strictions on international capital flows or removed any
existing restrictions relatively swiftly. The U.S. and Can-
ada have long had a large and sophisticated financial
system relatively unencumbered by regulations, domes-
tically as well as internationally. The U.S. imposed no
exchange controls in principle except for the period of
1963-1974 when some restrictions applied to capital out-
flows; these restrictions were removed in 1974. Canada,
the first industrialized country to shift to a floating ex-
change rateregime in 1970, also has been free ofexchange
controls. Over the years, the country also streamlined
procedures for foreign direct investment flows which were
quite liberal to begin with by international standards. For
both countries, therefore, regulatory changes pertaining to
international capital flow since the 1970s have been small
by international standards.
Hong Kong and Singapore relaxed capital controls rela-
tively early in a bid to become international financial
centers. Hong Kong abolished all exchange controls in late
1972, making its capital markets one ofthe least restricted
inAsia. Singaporeprogressivelyliberalizedexchangecon-
trols through the 1970s andfinally abolished them in 1978.
The city-state also established a favorable policy environ-
ment toward foreign direct investment, especially with
respect to repatriation ofprofit. The only notable remain-
ing barrier to capital mobility is the restriction that banks
designated to operate in the offshore market are not al-
lowed to transact in Singapore dollars.4 From the stand-
point ofregulatory impediments at least, both Hong Kong
and Singapore can thus be considered to have had nearly
perfect capital mobility since at least the early to mid-
1970s.
In contrast to Hong Kong and Singapore, the two other
rapidly growing Asian newly industrializing economies
(NIEs), Korea and Taiwan, have initiated financial deregu-
lation relatively late and substantial barriers to interna-
tional capital mobility still remain. Taiwan traditionally
domestic interestrateliberalization and greaterexchangerateflexibility.
In fact, exchange and capital controls are redundant in the face of
flexible interestratesand flexible exchange rates. Greenwood(1986), on
the other hand, holds the view that financial liberalization in the seven
East Asian countries do not appear to derive from the advent offloating
exchange rates in theearly 1970s. Mostofthe changes come after 1979,
which timing suggests that financial liberalization was prompted more
by the volatility of interest rate differentials than by the advent of
floating rates.
4. Singaporethus has abifurcatedfinancial system with various regula-
tions insulating the domestic banking sector from the offshore market.
Growthofthe offshore sector, inparticularthe Asiandollarmarket, has
been spectacular since its establishment in 1974.
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hasrestrictedcapitaloutflow anddidnotliberalizecontrols
on current account transactions until 1987. Although sig-
nificant progress has been made since 1989 in liberalizing
capital inflow and outflow, tight control is still applied on
foreign ownership of "strategic" industries, including
banking.
Korea beganits financial liberalizationprocess in 1981-
1983. But government controls remain a pervasive feature
of its financial system, particularly in the domain of
international financial transactions. The authorities have
adopted a gradual step-by-step approach to liberalizing
Clli.-rent account transactions and restrictions continue to
apply to both capital inflows and outflows.5 For example,
throughout the 1980s, government approval was required
for any external borrowing exceeding US$200,000. Be-
ginning in the early 1980s, however, the Korean govern-
ment initiated a series ofsteps deregulating foreign direct
investment to enhance competition in the domestic market
and to encourage transfer of advanced technology from
abroad.
The Philippines also still has extensive capital controls.
Unlike Korea and Taiwan, the Philippines initially had a
fairly liberalregime toward international capital flow. This
policy was abruptly reversed, however, withthe advent of
the international debt crisis in 1983. As the only Pacific
Basin country facing serious debt servicing problems, the
Philippines reimposed foreign exchange controls in 1983.
Although policies have relaxed somewhat since, restric-
tions remain in virtually all categories ofboth current and
capital account transactions.
The experiences of the remaining six countries (Aus-
tralia, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, andThai-
land) fall somewhere between the extremes of the two
groups of countries discussed above. All six initially
had stringent international capital exchange controls. The
speed and the timing of the relaxation of these controls
have varied considerably among them, however.
Indonesia and Malaysia liberalized foreign exchange
controls in 1970 and 1973, respectively, thus initiating
moves towardfairly opencapitalmarkets muchearlierthan
Taiwan orKorea. Both countries also progressivelyrelaxed
foreign direct investment rules from the mid-1980s on.
Some restrictions to capital flow remain, however. In the
case of Malaysia, capital outflows cannot be financed by
local borrowing and priorapproval is necessary for foreign
5. As ofDecember 1991, Koreans were still required to convert export
receipts intodomesticcurrencywithina specifiedtimeperiod. Themain
objective of this policy is to prevent the accumulation of foreign
exchange above some minimum working balance. In addition, to limit
possible disguised capital flight, payments on invisibles were subjectto
quantitative limits or advance approval.
25directinvestmentorforeign lending orborrowingby finan-
cial institutions. Additionally, surrender requirements for
export proceeds still remained in place as of December
1991. Indonesia still restricts capital account transactions
in three ways: foreign exchange banks and nonfinancial
institutions must adhere to Bank of Indonesia directives
when borrowing abroad; foreign exchange banks are re-
quired to set aside special reserves on foreign borrowing;
and finally, prior approval must be obtained for foreign
direct investment.6
Australia and New Zealand embarked relatively late in
financial liberalization, but once initiated, regulatory bar-
riers to capital mobility were dismantled quite quickly.
Australiaeliminated most exchange controls as ofDecem-
ber1983 when it moved to a flexible exchange rate regime.
Beside the frequently encountered requirement of prior
approval on foreign borrowing, the only notablerestriction
tocapitalflows inAustraliais thatforeign governments and
international organizations are not permitted to borrow in
the domestic capital market. New Zealand launched a
comprehensive financial liberalization program in 1984
which, within a space of a few months, freed interest
rate controls, credit ceilings, and ratio requirements, and
floated the New Zealand dollar.7 In this newly liberalized
regime, foreign exchange controls became redundant and
were disposed of accordingly. As of the end of 1991, the
only noteworthy restriction on capital account transactions
is thatpermissionis required for foreign direct investments
ofamounts NZ$lO million or greater.
Thailand andJapan, the last two countries underreview,
have both adhered to a program ofcautious and measured
paceoffinancial liberalization. Thailandfreed inwardcap-
ital flows in the early 1970s, but strict controls have
traditionally applied to capital outflows. This restriction
began to be loosened only recently in a stepwise fashion.
The first stage (May 1990) eased controls on current
account transactions and simplified capital account trans-
actions. Inthe second stage (April 1991), furtherliberaliza-
tion was implemented on current account transactions,
limits on outward capital flows without authorization was
raised, and banks were allowed for the first time to offer
foreign exchange accounts.8 In the final stage, yet to be
6. Recently, concern about the country's external debt has led Indone-
sianauthorities to set an annualquotaofUS$2.6billionfor borrowing to
finance private projects in 1992 and 1993.
7. New Zealand in fact initiated financial liberalization in 1976-1977,
butreversed course in1981 by reimposing comprehensive controls over
interest rates and foreign portfolio investment by domestic residents.
8. According to the International Monetary Fund, Thailand still had,
as of December 1991, surrender requirement for export proceeds, ad-
vancedimportdeposits, and limitations onforeign currency deposits by
residents.
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scheduled, all remaining foreign exchange controls are to
be lifted and residents are to be permitted to purchase
overseas property and financial instruments without prior
approval from the Central Bank.
Japan traditionally applied capital controls to influence
international capital flows in the desired direction, de-
pending upon the prevailing balance-of-payments position
and exchange rate objective. Japan amended its Foreign
Exchange and Foreign Trade Law in 1980, the official
intention being to free, in principle, all international trans-
actions from direct government intervention. In reality,
however, the process of financial liberalization, domestic
as well as international, was already set in motion by the
rnid-1970s. Forexample, interest rates on foreign currency
deposit were liberalized in 1974, foreigners were allowed
in the gensaki market in May 1979, and Japanese banks
were permitted to make short-term foreign currency loans
to residents (impact loans) in June 1979, and long-term
loans inMarch1980. The 1984Yen/DollarAgreementpro-
vided further impetus to remove barriers to international
capital flows, including the abolition of yen-dollar swap
limits for foreign banks in Japan and the deregulation of
forward exhange transactions. The relaxation of capital
controls in Japan, however, as is the case with domestic fi-
nancialliberalization, has beengradualandisstillongoing.
In summary, what can we say about capital mobility in
the Pacific Basin based on the foregoing survey ofregula-
tory changes? First, most liberalization in the region did
not begin until the late 1970s or the early 1980s; notable
exceptions are Canada, the U.S., and the two city-states.
One implication is that saving-investment linkages would
be tighterin most Pacific Basincountries than, say, among
OECD countries, which began liberalizing in the early
1970s with the advent offlexible exchange rates.9
The second point relates to the difference in the degree
of capital mobility among the Pacific Basin countries
discussed. Any cross-country comparison on capital
mobilitybasedon theseregulatory considerations is neces-
sarily an impreciseexercise. Forone, appraising theimpact
ofa change in policy onpotential capital mobility requires
a dose of subjective and qualitative judgements. In addi-
tion, since these countries have pursued different policies
atdifferentpoints in time, itis difficultto generalize across
along periodoftimewhetheronecountry'spolicyhas been
"on average" more restrictive than another with respect to
internationalcapitalflows. Thesecaveats notwithstanding,
one may hazard to divide the Pacific Basin countries into
three groups on the basis of how early each deregulated
international financial transactions, and on how rapidly
9. The usual ceteris paribus condition applies here.
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initiated. The first group, which includes Canada, the
U.S., Hong Kong, and Singapore, may be categorized as
having arelatively low degree ofcapitalcontrols, whilethe
second, consisting ofKorea, the Philippines, Taiwan, and
possibly Thailand, may be deemed to have ahighdegree of
capital controls. Itis difficultto assign apreciseranking to
the remaining countries; hence they may be grouped under
a third category ofintermediate degree ofcapital controls.
The balance of the paper investigates the extentto which
these varying degrees of capital controls in the region
explain observed differences in the response of domestic
investment to national saving.
II. THE FELDSTEIN-HoRIOKA TEST
OF CAPITAL MOBILITY
Itis natural to expect that the degree ofcapital controls is
an important determinant of investment's response to
national saving. Consider two extreme cases. If capital
controls prevent a country from borrowing (or lending)
internationally, all investment within the country must
necessarily be financed out of its own saving; in other
words national saving and investment will be perfectly
correlated. On the other hand, if there were no impedi-
ments to international capital flows, one would expect no
systematic relation between national saving and invest-
ment. One direct way to test these propositions is to run a
regression ofthe form:
(1) (GDIIGDP)i = ex + f3(GNSIGDP)i + Ei
where GDI and GNS are gross domestic investment and
saving, respectively, and GDP is gross domestic product.
This is infact the regression that Feldstein and Horioka ran
on a cross-section of sixteen OECD countries over the
period1960-1974. Theregressionusingdataaveragedover
the entire sample period yielded a coefficient on saving of
0.88, which is significantly different from zeto but not
significantly different from unity. Similar estimates of f3
were obtained when the regression was repeated on shorter
subsample periods. FH interpreted these results to mean
that about 90 percent ofdomestic saving is invested in the
country oforigin, thus leading them to reject the hypothe-
sis ofperfect capital mobility. 10 However, this conclusion
has been subjected to a number ofcriticisms.
10. Feldstein (1983) subsequently estimated the same equation using
pooled time series cross-section. data. Again, the coefficient on the
saving rate did not differ significantly from unity.
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Criticisms
The most frequently levied criticism against the FH meth-
odology concerns the fact that the explanatory variable in
their regression, domestic saving, is itself endogenous.
This will bethe case, for example, ifsaving and investment
are both procyclical, as they are commonly known to be.
Simultaneity problems also will arise if governments are
averse to large current account balances and respond
endogenously to offset private net capital flows so as to
reduce the size of these imbalances (Fieleke 1982, West-
phal 1983; Summers 1988). In a time series context. the
inclusion oflarge countries in the sample may be an~ther
cause of endogeneity. For instance, if a country is suffi-
ciently large, a decrease in saving in that country would
raise the world interest rate, thus reducing investment at
home as well as abroad (Murphy 1986).
On the theoretical front, a plethora ofmodels has been
constructed to formalize the notion that rather than re-
flecting any.genuine lack of capital mobility, the high
saving-investment correlation may arise because saving
and investment are influenced in the same direction by
common exogenous disturbances affecting the economy.
Forexample, even withperfect capital mobility, exogenous
changes in population growth, the growth rate ofincome,
productivity, or terms-of-trade shocks, may all generate
co-movements in savings and investment (see, for exam-
ple, Obstfeld 1985, Summers 1988, Glick and Rogoff
1992).11
Co-movements in saving and investment also may be
reconciled with perfect financial capital mobility by the
presence of nontraded consumption goods or immobile
factors ofproduction (Frankel 1985, Murphy 1986; Engel
and Kletzer 1987, Wong 1990). The basic intuition here is
that the integration of capital markets is not a sufficient
condition to break the link between domestic saving and
investment; imperfect integration of goods.markets or
other factors ofproduction may act as a binding constraint
and force the economy to behave more like a closed
economy in terms ofsaving and investment.
Finally, several authors have suggested that government
policy itself may be a source of endogeneity. Summers
(1988) and Bayoumi (1990) among others have suggested
that the observed high correlation between saving and
investment rates is evidence of a successful balance-of-
payment policy on the part of national governments. For
instance, governments may impose constraints on cross-
bordercapital flows whenever the deficit (or surplus) in the
current account exceeds a predetermined level. Alter-
natively, they might adjust their budget deficits to offset
11. See Tesar (1991) for a survey ofthese models.
27the gap between investment and saving. Finally, Roubini
(1988) argues in the context ofan intertemporal model of
consumptionandtaxation that fiscal deficits play an impor-
tantrole inthedeterminationofthe currentaccountandthe
saving behavior.
Robustness ofthe FH Result
Intheir original 1980 study, Feldstein and Horioka were in
fact cognizantofpotential problems thatmightarise due to
the endogeneity ofdomestic saving. To controlfor cyclical
endogeneity, the authors ran their cross=section regressions
using averaged data over sufficiently long periods so as to
cancel out any business cycle effects. As an added meas-
ure, FH also reran their regressions using instrumental
variables that are correlated with saving but not invest-
ment.12 This did not materially alter the results, however.
Moreover, instrumental variable estimations were subse-
quently performed by Dooley, et al. (1987) and Bayoumi
(1990) oncross-sectiondata, andby Frankel (1985) onU.S.
time series data. But again, all ofthese studies found that
the high savings-investment correlation persisted.
At least for a sample ofindustrialized countries, the FH
finding ofa high saving-investment correlation thus seems
to have stood up surprisingly well to the econometric
critiques levied against it. As noted above, however, nu-
merous theoretical models have cast doubt on whether
this empirical finding can be taken as evidence of low
capital mobility. To the extent that one. questions whether
FH's equation is genuinely structural, the high saving-
investment correlation may be attributed to a set of"omit-
ted variables," such as some common shocks orthe extent
ofintegration ofdomestic goods and factor markets. How-
ever, relatively little empirical work has been done to test
directly how sensitive FH's saving-investment correlation
is with respect to the inclusion ofsuch variables.
A notable exception is Wong (1990), which examined
whetherthe relative sizeofthe nontradedgoods sectorofan
economy has any effects on the correlation between its
saving and investmentratios. Wong ranked a sample of40
developingcountriesby theirimport-GDPratios, as aproxy
for the inverse of the size of the nontraded goods sector.
Breaking the sample into two and running separate regres-
sions on them, Wong found that the group with the lower
import ratios (that is, larger nontraded goods sector) had a
12. The instruments consisted ofthe proportion ofretirees and depend-
ents in the total population, the benefit-earning ratio of the social
security program, and the labor force participation rate. All of these
variables affect savingaccording to the incomehypothesis, butthey have
no obvious relevance for investment.
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higher regression coefficient on saving and a better good-
ness offit. Wong also found thata Chow testrejected at the
5 percentsignificancelevel the nullhypothesis thatthe two
country groups exhibit the same structural saving-invest-
ment relationship. Splitting the sample into finer groups
confirmed the basic finding that as countries' importratios
decrease the saving-inv~stment correlation increases.
m. SAVING-INVESTMENT CORRELATION
IN THE PACIFIC BASIN
Simple Saving-Investment Correlation
To serve as a benchmark, Table 1 presents the ordinary
least squares results for individual country time series
regression:
(2) t!.(GDIIGDP\ = a + t!.f3(GNS/GDP)t + Et.
The sample periodruns from 1961 to 1990 and all dataused
are nominal annual national account data from the IMF's
International Financial Statistics. Gross domestic invest-
ment, GDI, is defined as the sum of gross fixed capital
formation and the change in stocks. Gross national saving,
GNS, is defined as gross domestic saving (GDS) plus net
factor income and net currenttransfers from abroad; GDS,
in turn, is defined as gross domestic product (GDP) minus
private and government consumption. 13 Since both the
saving and investment exhibited a tendency to rise over
time in many ofthe sample countries, the regressions were
run on first-differenced data. 14
Oneadvantage ofrunning individualcountry time series
regressions is that it allows for any possible differences in
the degreeofcapitalmobility. InspectionofTable 1readily
reveals the diversity in the size and statistical significance
of the regression coefficient. Indeed, F tests rejected the
validity ofpooling for various combinations ofthe sample
countries: countries with relatively low capital controls
(Canada, U.S., Hong Kong, and Singapore); countries
with relatively high capital controls (Korea, Taiwan, Phil-
ippines, and Thailand); industrialized versus developing
countries; and finally, larger versus smaller countries as
measured by the size of GDP.
13. As in Feldstein and Horioka (1980), thefocus is on gross rather than
net saving and investment so as to minimize the possibility ofspurious
correlation due to measurement errors in depreciation.
14. Dickey-Fuller tests could reject the null hypothesis ofa unit root in
GDSIGDP and GDIIGDP only for New Zealand and Philippines. The
sametestonthe first-differenced series rejectedthis null, that is, yearto
year changes in saving and investment rates appear stationary.
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TOTAL INVESTMENT-SAVING CORRELATION,
1961-1990
tJ.(GDIIGDP)t = ex + f3tl(GNSIGDP\
[3 R2 D.W.
Australia 0.001 0.00 2.40
(0.157)
Canada 1.017*** 0.60 2.27
(0.160)
Hong Kong 0.616*** 0.31 2.13
(0.162)
Indonesia 0.211 0.08 2.32
(0.141)
Japan 0.981*** 0.65 1.54
(0.139)
Korea 0.446*** 0.24 1.76
(0.154)
Malaysia -0.112 0.02 1.43
(0.152)
New Zealand 0.116 0.01 1.97
(0.249)
Philippines 0.360* 0.06 1.54
(0.218)
Singapore -0.041 0.09 1.92
(0.263)
Taiwan 0.076 0.00 2.10
(0.249)
Thailand 0.639*** 0.31 2.36
(0.181)
U.S. 0.939*** 0.69 1.56
(0.126)
NOTE:OLS estimation; standard errors in parentheses.
*Significance levels: * = 10percent
** = 5 percent
*** = 1 percent
An immediately striking pattern in the table is that
Canada, the U.S., and Japan have a regression coefficient
onsaving that is not significantly different from unity; that
is, a 1percent increase in the growth ofthe national saving
rate leads to a 1 percent increase in the growth of the
Federal Reserve Bank ofSan Francisco
domestic investmentrate. 15,16Itisdifficultto reconcilethis
result with what we know about ca~ital controls in these
countries. As the earlier discussion stressed, Canada and
the U.S. have had among the least restrictive policies with
respect to international capital flows while Japan may be
considered an intermediate case.
Significantly lower coefficients are obtained for Korea,
Thailand, and the Philippines (0.446, 0.639, and 0.360,
respectively), despite the fact that these countries tradi-
tionally have imposed much greater regulatory barriers to
international capital flows. In a similar vein, Australia,
New Zealand, and Taiwan-countries which maintained




thePacific Basinhas increasedcapitalmobility andthereby
weakened the linkage between national saving and invest-
ment, regressions were run with the coefficient on saving
interactedwithadummyvariable. Thisvariabletookavalue
of0 until a givenbreakdate and a value of1thereafter. The
breakdates for each country were chosen to coincide with
the shift in regulatory regime or, in the case of advanced
industrializedcountries, the adventoftheflexibleexchange
systemafterthe collapse ofBrettonWoods. Fora subsetof
countries where the deregulation process did not yield a
strongprioronasinglebreakdate(Indonesia, Malaysia, and
Thailand), two alternative breakdates were considered.
As reported in Table 2, a statistically significant change
in savings-investment relationship is detected in only five
ofthe thirteen countries in the sample. Futhermore, where
such changes occurred, the results often were difficult to
interpret in terms of changes in capital mobility. For
instance, Singapore's saving coefficient turns from being
negative and statistically insignificant to being positive
and significantly different from 0 (at 5 percent) after the
breakdate. In the case of the U.S., the coefficient rises
from 0.632 to 1.097 after the breakdate, both statistically
significantly positive at the 5 percent level. Both ofthese
results appearanomalous inlightofourpriors basedon the
regulatory and institutional background on capital mobil-
ity in these countries. The results are equally puzzling for
the two cases where the saving coefficient declines in size
over time. In Korea, 13 turns from 0.528 (significantly
15. Recall that the regression was performed on first-differenced series
ofthe savings and investment rates.
16. Both the Ljung-Box Q statistic and the generalized LM test (not
reported) indicate the presence of serial correlation for only two
countries in the sample: Malaysia and Taiwan.
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TOTAL INVESTMENT-SAVING CORRELATION
ALLOWING FOR STRUCTURAL BREAK
!::.(GD/lGDP)t = ex + f3o!::.(GNSIGDP)t
+ f31 *D * !::.(GNSIGDP)t
Australia
Canada




countries than for the group ofPacific Basin countries; that
is, according to the PH interpretation, capital mobility has
been lower for the OECD countries than for the Pacific
Basin countries. The average size of 13 for these OECD
countries is 0.71 compared to 0.41 for the Pacific Ba-
sin countries; excluding the countries that overlap (that is,
U.S., Japan, and Canada) brings the average for the Pacific
Basin down to 0.23. These comparisons further call into
question whether one can draw unqualified inferences








Sensitivity ofthe Saving Coefficient to
Endogeneity Problems
As discussed in Section II, the "naive" version ofthe PH
saving-investment analysis may be fraught with endog-
eneityproblems. This couldbe due to the omissionofsome
third factor, such as growth or the relative size of the
nontradablesector. Alternatively, endogeneitymay bepres-
ent in the form ofpolicy responses by a government averse
to large external imbalances. This section explores the
extent to which the puzzles reported in the preceding sec-





1970; 1983 0.27 2.64
1973; 1983
1984
0.970** 1983 0.27 1.55
(0.435)













NOTE: OLS estimation; standard errors in parentheses. The critical
values for 13 were determined by a bootstrap procedure. D denotes the
bivariate dummy variable which takes a value of 1 in the years indi-
cated and a value of0 in the earlier years. Blank spaces in columns
130 and 131 indicate that no statistically significant structural break was
found for the break date. For Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand, two
alternative break dates were tested. The result reported for Indonesia
pertains to the 1970 break date. See Table 1for significance levels.
different from 0 at 1 percent) to - 0.591 (significant at
5 percent) after the breakdate. The coefficient on saving
in Indonesia also turns negative (but insignificant) after
the breakdate.
Finally, for purposes of broader international compari-
son, Table 3 reproduces time series estimates of 13 for a
number ofOECD countries reported by other authors. As
can be readily inspected, the size of the coefficient on










If saving and investment both respond to some common
exogenous shocks, ordinary least squares estimates of 13
will be upwardly biased. One simple way to correct this
problem is to use fixed investment rather than total invest-
ment as the dependent variable (Bayoumi 1990).17 The
difference between the two is inventory investment, which
arguably is muchmore susceptible to unexpected shocks to
the economy.
The results reported in Table 4 indeed show the size and
the significance of the regression coefficient falling for a
number ofcountries when fixed investment is used as the
dependent variable. The fall is particularly marked for
Canada, Japan, and the U.S., with the size of 13 roughly
halfofthat obtainedfrom the regression using total invest-
ment. A non-neglible decline in the coefficient is also
observed for Korea and Hong Kong. These results suggest
that for a subset ofthe sample countries at least, aggregate
demand and supply shocks may explain a significant part
17. As mentioned earlier, another method to deal with the endogeneity
problem is instrumental variable estimation. For most of the sample
countries, however, the variables typicallyusedinthe literatureas being
correlated with saving butnot investment (seefootnote 12) turned out to
be poor instruments. The instrumental variable estimation results are
therefore not reported.
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TOTAL INVESTMENT-SAVING CORRELATION FIXED INVESTMENT-SAVING CORRELATION,
FOR TWELVE OECD COUNTRIES, 1961-1986 1961-1990
f)..(GDIIGDP)t = a + rpf)..(GNSIGDP)t f)..(GDFIIGDP)t = a + rpf)..(GNSIGDP)t
13 13 R2 D.W.
Austriaa 0.72 Australia 0.011 0.00 1.76
(0.28) (0.085)
Belgium 0.63 Canada 0.401*** 0.23 1.43
(0.12) (0.140)
Canada 0.83 Hong Kong 0.461*** 0.20 2.00
(0.16) (0.175)
Federal Republic of Germany 0.87 Indonesia 0.252 0.17 2.23
(0.17) (0.108)
Finland 0.98 Japan 0.522*** 0.37 1.31
(0.30) (0.130)
France 0.80 Korea 0.261** 0.13 1.34
(0.26) (0.128)
Greece 0.73 Malaysia -0.338*** 0.24 0.91
(0.13) (0.117)
Italya 0.75 New Zealand -0.039 0.00 1.93
(0.29) (0.145)
Japanb 0.84 Philippines 0.259 0.06 1.29
(0.15) (0.195)
Norwayb -0.21 Singapore 0.176 0.03 1.20
(0.31) (0.198)
United Kingdom 0.33 Taiwan -0.266** 0.14 1.09
(0.18) (0.128)
United States 1.00 Thailand 0.203 0.07 1.32
(0.10) (0.139)
SOURCE: Bayoumi (1990), Table 7; data for Austria and Italy taken U.S. 0.492*** 0.57 1.32
from Obstfeld (1989), Table 7.6. (0.081)
NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses. R2 and D.W. statistics are not
reported by the authors.
aData for 1967-1984. NOTE: OLS estimation; standard errors in parentheses.
bData for 1966-1986. See Table 1 for significance levels.
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 31of the time series correlation between total saving and
investment.18 Even adjusting for such an endogeneity
problem, however, Table 4 leaves a puzzling pattern: 13
tends to be largest and statistically significant in Canada,
Hong Kong, Japan, and the U.S. With the exception of
Japan, these are also countries with relatively lower barri-
ers to capital mobility.19
Controllingfor Growth
and the Role ofNontradables
As noted earlier, a number offormal models demonstrate
that saving and investment will be correlated, even with
perfectcapital mobility, due to factors suchas productivity
shocksorlackofintegrationofgoods markets. This section
explores, albeit in a preliminary fashion, whether any sys-
tematic changes in saving-investment correlation can be
detectedfor thePacific Basincountries when the simplere-
gression equation (2) is controlled for some ofthese omit-
ted variables.
The analysis focuses on two variables. The first is the
rateofgrowthinGDP, whichhas beensuggestedin several
studies as a possible spurious variable in the saving-
investment regression (for example, Obstfeld 1985, Fry
1986). For instance, countries with rising incomes are
likely to exhibitboth higherrates ofsaving and investment
over time.Ifthis argument is correct, one would expectthe
regression coefficient on saving to decline when growth
is included as an explanatory variable. Following Wong
(1990), the second variable examinedis theratio ofimports
to GDP, as an inverse proxy for the relative size of the
nontradedgoods sector. Themaintainedassumptionhereis
that the larger the ratio ofimports to GDP, the more open
orintegrated is the economy withrespectto the goods mar-
ket. The inclusion ofthis variable in the regression equa-
tion is therefore hypothesized to also reduce thesizeof 13.
The individual country regression equations were ofthe
form:20
( GD!) (GNS) ( M ) (3) Jl GDP t = « + 13Jl GDP t + 'YJl GDP t
A ( GDPt ) +'L.1 GDP
t
-
1 + Et .
18. Similar time series results are reported by Bayoumi (1990) for ten
GEeD countries over a slightly shorter sample period of 1960-1986.
19. Structural break tests using CDFl did not yield results that were
materially different from those in Table 4. For the sake of brevity,
therefore, tlIese results are not reported.
20. Openness and growth were nonstationary and hence were first
differenced. Regressions were run with these variables entered directly
32
The results reported in Table 5 show that the import-to-
GDP ratio, or the "openness" variable, turns out to be
highly significant for all countries in the sample, with
Singapore as the notable exception. The growth variable,
on the other hand, is significant in only two. countries
(Australia and Indonesia). When controlled for these two
effects, the linkagebetweensaving and investmentappears .
to weaken for at least a subset ofPacific Basin countries.21
Again, the decline in 13 is mostconspicuous inCanadaand
the U.S., from 1.017 to 0.695 and from 0.939 to 0.710,
respectively, while in the case ofHong Kong, 13 turns from
0.616 (significant at 1percent) to being statistically insig-
nificant. A decline in 13 is also observed for Japan and
Thailand, butthe change in the sizeofthe estimatedcoeffi-
cient appears too marginal relative to the size of the
standard error to warrant a firm conclusion.
The augmented model thus provides some limited evi-
denceofthe omittedvariableproblem in the simple saving-
investment correlation analysis. Some "anomalies" never-
theless remain in the results of the augmented model.
Notably, 13 rises in the Philippines from a marginally
significant 0.360 in the simple model to 0.496 (signifi-
cantly different from zero at the 1 percent level) in the
augmentedmodel. Forthe remaining countries, the regres-
sion coefficient on saving is statistically not different from
zero in the augmented model as in the basic model. The
discrepancy between the earlier assessment of capital
controls in the samplecountries andthe estimated size of 13
therefore remains largely unaccounted for.
The Role ofPolicy Response
toward External Imbalances
A number ofstudies have suggested that the high correla-
tion between saving and investment reflects successful
as well as interactively, that is:
~ (CDI) = (X + (~ + "Io~ (~) + ~o~ (~))
CD? , l CD? , CD?'_I
* ~ (CNS) + ~ (~) + r ~ ( CD?, ) + E
CD? "11 CD? ':>1 CD? ' t t (-1
The interactive terms turned out to be statistically insignificant; hence
only the model featuring tlIe direct effects of openness and growth is
reported.
21. Again, the standard F test rejected the pooling of data. Only the
individual country time series results are thereforereported. The Box-
Ljung Q statistics indicate tlIe presence ofserial correlation only in the
Malaysia equation.
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EFFECTS OF IMPORT SHARE AND GROWTH ON THE INVESTMENT-SAVING CORRELATION
(GDI) (GNS) ( M)( GDPt





~ "I ~ R2 Q-msl
Australia 0.141 1.149*** 0.167*** 0.750 0.925
(0.082) (0.129) (0.046)
Canada 0.695*** 0.491*** 0.047 0.685 0.909
(0.210) (0.152) (0.070)
Hong Kong 0.595 0.174** -0.065 0.468 0.972
(0.150) (0.088) (0.059)
Indonesia 0.015 0.404*** -0.007*** 0.246 0.266
(0.151) (0,139) (0.002)
Japan 0.892*** 0.433*** 0.042 0.759 0.352
(0.134) (0.111) (0.047)
Korea 0.482*** 0.457*** ~0.001 0.356 0.607
(0.164) (0.160) (0.004)
Malaysia 0.015 0.422*** 0.012 0.447 0.021
(0.157) (0.090) (0.061)
New Zealand 0.237 0.763*** 0.025 0.543 0.327
(0.178) (0.128) (0.076)
Philippines 0.496*** 0.502*** 0.077 0.474 0.547
(0.191) (0.105) (0.066)
Singapore 0.Q75 0.082 0.056 0.030 0.251
(0.280) (0.051) (0.114)
Taiwan -0.191* 0.691*** -0.036 0.810 0.177
(0.110) (0.081) (0.026)
Thailand 0.555*** 0.578*** 0.106 0.600 0.292
(0.141) (0.121) (0.055)
U.S. 0.710*** 0;632 0.123 0.736 0.960
(0.146) (0.279) (0.123)
NOTE: OLS estimation; standard errors in parentheses. Q-msl is the marginal significance level ofthe Box-Ljung Qstatistics for serial
correlation.
Federal Reserve Bank ofSan Francisco 33balance-of-payment policy on the part ofnational govern-
ments (Fieleke 1982, Summers 1988, Bayoumi 1990).22 In
particular, Summers (1988) argues thatifgovernments are
averse to large capital inflows or outflows, they might
adjust their budget deficits to offset the gap between
private saving and investment.23
To see whether such policy responses may account for
the puzzling cross-country difference in the size of [3, the
following set ofregression equations was estimated:
(4) MDEFIGDP)t = a + 4>t1(CPS-GDI)IGDP)p
where DEF is general government budgetdeficit andPS is
privatesaving. <I> = 1implies that fiscal policy completely
offsets any imbalance in private saving and investment so
that no capital flow occurs; in the polar opposite case of
<I> = 1, which is an implicit assumption in FH, deficits are
exogenous.
As reported inTable 6, the coefficient 4> is significantly
different from zero and positive in all of the countries
except Australia, Taiwan, and the Philippines. More re-
vealing, however, is the cross-country comparison of the
size of the estimated regression coefficient. The govern-
ment's propensity to offset current account imbalances
tends to be weaker in countries with lower saving-invest-
mentcorrelation. With the notable exception ofKorea, and
to a lesser extent New Zealand, countries with high or
intermediate cases ofcapital control (Tai\van, Philippines,
Thailand, Malaysia, andIndonesia) have arelatively low or
statisticallyinsignificant [3 (as reportedinTables 1, 4, or5)
and also tend to have a low or statististically insignificant
<1>. Bycontrast, countries with low orintermediatedegrees
of capital controls (Canada, the U.S., and Japan) and a
relatively high [3, tend to have relatively high 4>; that is, the
"endogenous" policy response to maintain external bal-
ance tends to be higher in Pacific Basin countries with a
22. Possible justifications for discouraging capital outflows include:
social return to domestic investment exceeding that of foreign invest-
ment, risk ofcapital expropriation by foreign government or labor, and
negative terms of trade effects. Aversion to a large influx of foreign
capital may be due to a large appreciation in the real exchange rate and
its deleterious impact on the economy's traded goods sector.
23. This is notto say thatfiscal policyis determinedexclusively, oreven
primarily, outofbalance ofpayments considerations. Rather, it is when
thecurrentaccountbalanceexceeds somepredeterminedlevelthatfiscal
oreven monetary policies are implemented to reduce oreliminate those
deficits or surpluses. One example is efforts initiated by the U.S. in the
second half of the 1980s to reduce the budget deficit, and thereby put
a checkon the ballooningcurrent account deficit. Anotherexample ofa
policy reaction in the opposite direction is Japan which, in a bid to
reduce unprecedented current account surpluses.that emerged in the




TEST OF THE ENDOGENOUS POLICY RESPONSE
HYPOTHESIS
ACDEFlGDP)t = ex + ~A((PS-GD[)/GDP)t
SAMPLE PERIOD <I> R2 D.W.
Australia 1962-90 0.064 0.02 1.68
(0.078)
Canada 1962-89 0.569*** 0.38 2.21
(0.141)
Hong Kong 1972-90 0.232*** 0.22 1.91
(0.107)
Indonesia 1962-89 0.237*** 0.38 2.13
(0.059)
Japan 1971-89 0.473*** 0.38 1.69
(0.145)
Korea 1962-90 0.925*** 0.77 1.72
(0.032)
Malaysia 1965-90 0.300*** 0.58 1.49
(0.052)
New Zealand 1962-90 0.435*** 0.49 2.42
(0.085)
Philippines 1962-90 0.160* 0.10 2.62
(0.094)
Singapore 1962-90 0.597*** 0.72 2.39
(0.072)
Taiwan 1962-90 -0.072 0.04 2.34
(0.064)
Thailand 1964-90 0.360*** 0.24 2.33
(0.129)
U.S. 1962-90 0.786*** 0.65 2.11
(0.110)
NOTE: OLS estimation; standard errors in parentheses. DEF denotes
general government budget deficit and PS denotes private saving.
See Table 1 for significance levels.
high saving-investment correlation.24 These findings thus
do help to reconcile the puzzling pattern that the saving-
investment correlation tended to be relatively weaker
or insignificant in countries which traditionally imposed
higher restrictions on international capital flows.
24. The exception here is Singapore which had an insignificant f3 but a
relatively high <1>.
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EXTERNAL DEBT INDICATORS
INDONESIA KOREA MALAYSIA PHILIPPINES THAILAND
PuBLIC DEBT AS PERCENT OF GNP
1970 25.6 20.3 9.5 8.8 4.6
1975 25.5 27.5 14.2 9.2 4.2
1980 20.1 26.3 17.0 19.2 12.4
1985 31.9 32.7 52.0 43.6 26.9
1990 44.0 7.5 39.9 51.7 15.8
TOTAL DEBT AS PERCENT OF GNP
1980 28.0 48.7 28.0 49.5 26.0
1985 43.8 52.5 71.9 83.9 47.8
1990 66.4 14.4 48.3 65.4 32.6
GOVERNMENT DEFICIT AS PERCENT OF GNP
1970 3.02 0.77 3.77 0.14 3.66
1975 3.70 1.98 8.47 1.19 2.06
1980 2.42 2.23 13.33 1.39 4.88
1985 0.98 1.17 7.36 1.95 5.46
1990 0.90 0.70 2.70 3.46 4.84
FOREIGN BORROWING AS PERCENT OF GOVERNMENT DEFICIT
1970 87.1 66.6 0.4 100.0 NA
1975 97.0 77.2 47.8 18.7 83.0
1980 92.9 38.3 4.4 66.0 23.5
1985 74.4 46.9 16.8 0.0 32.8
1990 NA 27.2 NA 11.1 0.0
SOURCES: World Bank, World Debt Tables, and IMF, International
Financial Statistics.
Infact, Table 7presents evidence suggesting thatfor this
lattergroup ofcountries, the goverIlmentitselfhas played a
central role in the flow offoreign borrowing, thus driving
a wedgebetweennationalsaving andinvestment. Through-
out the 1980s, public or publicly guaranteed debt usually
accountedfor anywherebetweenone-halfto three-quarters
of total foreign borrowing in all five countries,25 with
significant proportions of the foreign borrowing going
toward financing the government budgetdeficit.26Though
comparable data are unavailable for the earlier period, the
relative importance ofpublic borrowing was undoubtedly
even higher, and this may constitute an additional reason
25. The sources cited do not report data for Taiwan.
26. Kharas and Kiguel (1988) provides a systematic analysis on this
issue.
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why saving-investmentlinkages are weakerinthese Pacific




investment correlation for a group of Pacific Basin coun-
tries. Its main findings may be summarized as follows.
First, the simple bivariate saving-investment model (as
originallyformulated by FH) yieldedcoefficientson saving
thatoftencontradictedourpriorsbasedonourknowledgeof
capital controls in the region. Most notably, the saving
coefficients were much higher and statistically significant
in countries that have traditionally imposed much looser
capital controls. Additionally, structural break tests in
saving-investmentcorrelationfailed to detect the effects of
regulatory shifts for most ofthe sample countries.
Part of this anomalous pattern across countries in the
size of the estimated coefficient can be accounted for by
simultaneity problems. For a subset ofcountries, control-
ling for the procyclicality ofinventory investment reduced
the size ofthe estimated coefficient on saving. The growth
rate and the openness of the economy (as a proxy of the
integration ofthe goods market) were also found to exert a
negative impact on the overall saving-investment correla-
tion. These results thus provide some support to models
that emphasize the role exogenous shocks or the nontrad-
able sector play in explaining observed co-movements in
savings and investment.
A more significant factor accounting for the puzzling
pattern of tighter saving-investment linkages found in
countries with relatively lower capital controls, however,
appears to be the greater propensity ofgovernment policy
to counteract large external imbalances. By contrast, such
policyreactions appearmuch weakerinthose Pacific Basin
countries withrelativelyhighercapitalcontrols. Infact, for
this group ofcountries, the financing ofthe public sector
deficit itself has been an important impetus to capital
inflow, and this appears to have helped to weaken the link
between domestic investment and savings.
27. Again, the Korean evidence is difficult to interpret. The result in
Table 6 suggests a very high propensity of the Korean government to
engage in fiscal policy thaf counteracts external imbalances. The
evidence in Table 7 appears to contradict this interpretation.
35ApPENDIX
SUMMARY OF CAPITAL CONTROLS IN PACIFIC BASIN COUNTRIES
KEy:
X HEAVY RESTRICTIONS:
full surrenderofexportproceeds; advancedexportdeposits required; tightrestrictions onsizeofpennittedpaymentsfor
invisibles; foreign currency deposits not allowed; foreign borrowing/lending with prior approval only; taxes or reserve
requirements on foreign borrowing.
* MODERATE RESTRICTIONS:
surrenderofexportproceeds required above set limit; fractional advanced import deposits required; fewei iestrictions or
moderate limits on payments for invisibles; foreign currency deposits allowed with set limits and with transaction
notification requirements; foreign borrowing/lending pennitted within set limits.
o MILD RESTRICTIONS:
payments for invisibles subject to verification; fewer restrictions on size and flexibility offoreign currency accounts;
foreign borrowingllending permitted without approval but limits apply to net foreign currency position.
No RESTRICTIONS:
indicated by a blank.
AUSTRALIA
1960 - 1969 1970 - 1979 1980 - 1989 1990 - 1992
Required Surrender ofExport Proceeds
Advanced Import Deposits
Payments for/Proceeds from Invisibles
Foreign Currency Deposits by Residents
Foreign Lending/Borr. by Financial Institutions
Tax or Special Reserve Req. on Foreign Borr.
CANADA
Required Surrender ofExport Proceeds
Advanced Import Deposits
Payments for/Proceeds from Invisibles
Foreign Currency Deposits by Residents
Foreign Lending/Borr. by Financial Institutions
Tax or Special Reserve Req. on Foreign Borr.
HONG KONG
Required Surrender ofExport Proceeds
Advanced Import Deposits
Payments for/Proceeds from Invisibles
Foreign Currency Deposits by Residents
Foreign Lending/Borr. by Financial Institutions
Tax or Special Reserve Req. on Foreign Borr.
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